//essays//
Spring 2017
Confucius Confusion
China-Funded Columbia Institute Raises Questions
Leeza Hirt
“Don’t expect to read these texts with your next professor,” the Chinese instructor told the class before she departed on sick leave last Fall. “If they replace me with someone from the Confucius Institute, there’s no way you’ll be reading these works by Chinese dissidents anymore.”
The class was Fourth-Year Chinese I, and the professor—aTaiwanese-American less than pleased with the Chinese government’s policies—designed a syllabus meant to expose students to the vast diversity of opinion in Chinese society. In the class workbook that she created, she included texts by dissidents and Tibetans in addition to classic Chinese texts. This does not make her unique; most Chinese professors in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures (EALAC) include a diverse array of sources in their syllabi. But, she warned, this would all come to an end if an instructor from the Confucius Institute took over for her during her leave of absence.
Founded in 2004, the Confucius Institute operates under the guidance of the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Guojia Hanyu Gouji Tuigang Lingdau Xiaozu Bangongshi, known by its abbreviation, Hanban), a non-profit organization affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education. Hanban is comprised of members from state ministries and other organizations, including the State Council, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture. Hanban’s headquarters is in Beijing, where it is governed by a body whose chair, vice-chair, and executive council are appointed by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council, the chief administrative body of the People’s Republic of China.
Confucius Institutes are typically created through a partnership between two academic institutions, one foreign and one Chinese. Hanban provides start-up money for the institutes, usually located on university or high school campuses. Since 2004, over 150 such centers have been established in the United States, and hundreds more have been founded overseas. Each institute has its own character, but all are committed to the mission of “promoting Chinese language and culture and supporting local Chinese language teaching.”
China’s motivations in funding Confucius Institutes are rather intuitive. Over the past few decades, American interest in learning Chinese has skyrocketed. As the Chinese economy develops and becomes more privatized, many Americans want to be able to do business there but are deterred by the steep language barrier. The Chinese government recognized this issue, and in its own economic self-interest decided to invest in Chinese education programs abroad. If Westerners learn Chinese, then they will be able to do business in China, thereby facilitating economic growth.
But China’s motivations are not only economic.There are also clear political incentives to funding Confucius Institutes. As China builds up its military and economic power, it is increasingly perceived as a threat to the well-being of foreign companies, to U.S. security, to peace and stability, and to human rights. Throughout the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump constantly portrayed China as America’s greatest competitor and threat.
In a 2009 journal article on the subject, Dr. James Paradise argues that China realizes that it has a public relations problem, and is trying to enhance its image with a “soft power offensive,” aimed at demystifying China to Westerners and promoting a positive perception of China in the world. Most scholars define soft power as does political scientist Joseph Nye: “The ability to get what you want through attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”
There is clear support for this idea at the highest levels of Chinese government. In a keynote speech at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007, Former President Hu Jintau called for increasing China’s soft power through cultural enhancement for reasons of national cohesion and overall national strength. In July of that year, Jia Qinlin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, called for bolstering the country’s soft power through cultural development: “Cultural development, a main theme in building a country’s soft power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national power.”
According to Dr. Paradise and many others, Hanban has played an integral role in this exercise of “soft power” by spreading a positive message about China to young people overseas. The first step of this process was its collaboration with the College Board to create an Advanced Placement Program Course and Examination in Chinese Language and Culture in 2003, funded by the Chinese government. Through this brilliant step, the population of American high school students learning Chinese increased dramatically, and many of these students continued to study the language in college. Additionally, Hanban was able to influence the curriculum of the AP course, and culled sources that would paint China is a positive light.
The next step in this project was the establishment of the Confucius Institute in 2004, which erected centers for Chinese language and culture on university and high school campuses, and also trained and sent instructors to teach at these institutes. Since Hanban is an official arm of China’s ruling party—not one known for its tolerance—these curricula tend not to include perspectives that are critical of China. Thus, through Confucius Institutes, China is setting up mini propaganda centers on American campuses, influencing students’ perceptions of China through their language courses.
In 2010, Hanban pledged to donate $1 million to Columbia University. The money, to be paid out over the next five years, was slated for the establishment of a Confucius Institute on campus in partnership with the Renmin University of China. Professor Lening Liu, a longtime member of the Department of East Asian Studies, was appointed to lead the institute, whose particular aim would be to fund faculty research and events related to Chinese languages and culture. After a three year delay, Columbia’s Confucius Institute actually began its operations in April 2013.
Intrigued by the existence of an institute at Columbia that is funded by the Chinese government, I reached out to almost every single member of the EALAC department in order to learn more about the Institute. I wanted to know exactly how this partnership works, and the extent of Hanban’s authority over the curricula. However, the few faculty members that actually responded to me immediately directed my questions to Professor Liu. After weeks of unsuccessfully trying to get in touch with Liu via email, I decided to show up to his office hours and to ask him about it there.
In his sixth floor office in Kent Hall—which doubles as the headquarters of Columbia’s Confucius Institute—Liu confided that my inquiries had resulted in departmental discussion: “We recently had a meeting in our department and decided that all inquiries about the institute should be directed to the University Office of Public Affairs, since it has been controversial.” He added, “I already answered all of the possible questions in the Spectator and in Bloomberg News.”
The articles to which Liu was referring were published in 2011, before Columbia’s Confucius Institute even opened its doors. In the Columbia Daily Spectator article in 2011 (the campus newspaper’s only coverage of the topic), Liu said that Columbia’s Confucius Institute is committed to academic integrity and that it would review all research proposals, including those that mention Tibet.
Though this at first seems somewhat reassuring, this article was written before Columbia’s Confucius Institute began its operations, and has no bearing on whether the Institute actually operates according to Liu’s promises. It does not tell us whether the Confucius Institute has, in its four years of existence, ever funded any research proposals that mention Tibet, and whether its faculty are free to design their syllabi as they choose. From the Institute’s public programming advertised online until this point, it does not seem that they have run any programming that is remotely controversial.
Upon Professor Liu’s suggestion, I reached out to the University Office of Public Affairs with my inquiry. Although for a while it seemed that someone would be willing to talk to me, I ultimately received the following email from Robert Hornsby, Associate Vice President for Media Relations:
"No one is available for an interview about this matter. Briefly for your background, the Confucius Institute provides funding to Columbia in support of Chinese language programs, the study of Chinese culture and research. Faculty members supported under the grant remain subject to the University’s routine policies, practices, and rules regarding faculty members generally at the University. In addition, under Columbia’s agreement with the Institute, Columbia retains sole academic decision-making authority for all activities at the Columbia campus, including activities funded under the agreement. We have been pleased with the program’s success to date."
According to the Constitution and Bylaws of the Confucius Institutes (located on the Hanban website), foreign parties that apply to establish a Confucius Institute should be willing to “accept Confucius Institutes’ operation model and teaching model and be able to accept the oversight, evaluation and certification by the Head Office once the Institute is established.” Additionally, “All institutes must use the unified set of teaching materials supplied by the Head Office.” It also states that they “shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China” and “shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of the Confucius Institute” (Section 1, articles 6 and 7). Finally, all Confucius Institutes are required to observe the obligation “to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the Headquarters.”
This document explicitly states that in order to receive funding, all Confucius Institutes must comply with the rules of the Headquarters in Beijing. Did Columbia strike a special deal with Hanban, allowing its Confucius Institute to exercise complete academic freedom? What, exactly, are the terms of this agreement? No one from the Confucius Institute at Columbia nor the Office of Public Affairs would answer this question.
Many members of the academic community have expressed concern over the spread of Confucius Institutes on American college campuses. In April 2014, more than 100 professors at University of Chicago signed a petition calling for the school to shut down its on-campus Confucius Institute. The petition stated that the University lacked sufficient control over the hiring and training of teachers involved and argued that terminating the relationship would be “consistent with the intellectual principles and values of the university.” This petition was successful, and Chicago’s Confucius Institute was closed soon after. Several other universities, including the seven other members of the Ivy League besides for Columbia, have refused to affiliate with the Confucius Institute in the first place.
And yet, despite the public controversy over the Confucius Institute on other campuses, there has been virtually no conversation about it at Columbia. Aside from one Spectator article when the Institute was established in 2011, it has not been mentioned in any student or University produced publication ever since. This could be because Columbia’s Confucius Institute has a little more autonomy than Confucius Institutes on other campuses. Professor Liu frames the program as a vehicle for academic exchange and mutual understanding, not as a forum for Chinese influence at Columbia. However, there is no evidence that this is actually the case.
Columbia’s Confucius Institute does not have a website that details its operations and lists its affiliated faculty. In fact, the only information about it on the internet is limited to an old webpage on the Hanban website, that states its location, its partnership with Renmin University, and the date it opened. There is no mention of the Institute on the website of the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, save for in Professor Liu’s official title as Director. Additionally, the list of faculty affiliated with the Institute are nowhere to be found nor are the researchers and instructors who receive funding.
If Columbia wants us to believe that its branch of the Confucius Institute does not violate the principles of academic freedom, then the University must be more transparent about the Institute’s programming. At the very least, the Office of Public Affairs should be open about what the Hanban’s money actually funds. The Confucius Institute’s mission, faculty, and research topics should be on the EALAC website, or it should have a website of its own. Additionally, the exact terms of Columbia’s agreement with Hanban should be made open to the public. If they cannot do these simple tasks, the University will strengthen the suspicion that they actually have something to hide.
The class was Fourth-Year Chinese I, and the professor—aTaiwanese-American less than pleased with the Chinese government’s policies—designed a syllabus meant to expose students to the vast diversity of opinion in Chinese society. In the class workbook that she created, she included texts by dissidents and Tibetans in addition to classic Chinese texts. This does not make her unique; most Chinese professors in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures (EALAC) include a diverse array of sources in their syllabi. But, she warned, this would all come to an end if an instructor from the Confucius Institute took over for her during her leave of absence.
Founded in 2004, the Confucius Institute operates under the guidance of the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Guojia Hanyu Gouji Tuigang Lingdau Xiaozu Bangongshi, known by its abbreviation, Hanban), a non-profit organization affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education. Hanban is comprised of members from state ministries and other organizations, including the State Council, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture. Hanban’s headquarters is in Beijing, where it is governed by a body whose chair, vice-chair, and executive council are appointed by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council, the chief administrative body of the People’s Republic of China.
Confucius Institutes are typically created through a partnership between two academic institutions, one foreign and one Chinese. Hanban provides start-up money for the institutes, usually located on university or high school campuses. Since 2004, over 150 such centers have been established in the United States, and hundreds more have been founded overseas. Each institute has its own character, but all are committed to the mission of “promoting Chinese language and culture and supporting local Chinese language teaching.”
China’s motivations in funding Confucius Institutes are rather intuitive. Over the past few decades, American interest in learning Chinese has skyrocketed. As the Chinese economy develops and becomes more privatized, many Americans want to be able to do business there but are deterred by the steep language barrier. The Chinese government recognized this issue, and in its own economic self-interest decided to invest in Chinese education programs abroad. If Westerners learn Chinese, then they will be able to do business in China, thereby facilitating economic growth.
But China’s motivations are not only economic.There are also clear political incentives to funding Confucius Institutes. As China builds up its military and economic power, it is increasingly perceived as a threat to the well-being of foreign companies, to U.S. security, to peace and stability, and to human rights. Throughout the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump constantly portrayed China as America’s greatest competitor and threat.
In a 2009 journal article on the subject, Dr. James Paradise argues that China realizes that it has a public relations problem, and is trying to enhance its image with a “soft power offensive,” aimed at demystifying China to Westerners and promoting a positive perception of China in the world. Most scholars define soft power as does political scientist Joseph Nye: “The ability to get what you want through attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”
There is clear support for this idea at the highest levels of Chinese government. In a keynote speech at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007, Former President Hu Jintau called for increasing China’s soft power through cultural enhancement for reasons of national cohesion and overall national strength. In July of that year, Jia Qinlin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, called for bolstering the country’s soft power through cultural development: “Cultural development, a main theme in building a country’s soft power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national power.”
According to Dr. Paradise and many others, Hanban has played an integral role in this exercise of “soft power” by spreading a positive message about China to young people overseas. The first step of this process was its collaboration with the College Board to create an Advanced Placement Program Course and Examination in Chinese Language and Culture in 2003, funded by the Chinese government. Through this brilliant step, the population of American high school students learning Chinese increased dramatically, and many of these students continued to study the language in college. Additionally, Hanban was able to influence the curriculum of the AP course, and culled sources that would paint China is a positive light.
The next step in this project was the establishment of the Confucius Institute in 2004, which erected centers for Chinese language and culture on university and high school campuses, and also trained and sent instructors to teach at these institutes. Since Hanban is an official arm of China’s ruling party—not one known for its tolerance—these curricula tend not to include perspectives that are critical of China. Thus, through Confucius Institutes, China is setting up mini propaganda centers on American campuses, influencing students’ perceptions of China through their language courses.
In 2010, Hanban pledged to donate $1 million to Columbia University. The money, to be paid out over the next five years, was slated for the establishment of a Confucius Institute on campus in partnership with the Renmin University of China. Professor Lening Liu, a longtime member of the Department of East Asian Studies, was appointed to lead the institute, whose particular aim would be to fund faculty research and events related to Chinese languages and culture. After a three year delay, Columbia’s Confucius Institute actually began its operations in April 2013.
Intrigued by the existence of an institute at Columbia that is funded by the Chinese government, I reached out to almost every single member of the EALAC department in order to learn more about the Institute. I wanted to know exactly how this partnership works, and the extent of Hanban’s authority over the curricula. However, the few faculty members that actually responded to me immediately directed my questions to Professor Liu. After weeks of unsuccessfully trying to get in touch with Liu via email, I decided to show up to his office hours and to ask him about it there.
In his sixth floor office in Kent Hall—which doubles as the headquarters of Columbia’s Confucius Institute—Liu confided that my inquiries had resulted in departmental discussion: “We recently had a meeting in our department and decided that all inquiries about the institute should be directed to the University Office of Public Affairs, since it has been controversial.” He added, “I already answered all of the possible questions in the Spectator and in Bloomberg News.”
The articles to which Liu was referring were published in 2011, before Columbia’s Confucius Institute even opened its doors. In the Columbia Daily Spectator article in 2011 (the campus newspaper’s only coverage of the topic), Liu said that Columbia’s Confucius Institute is committed to academic integrity and that it would review all research proposals, including those that mention Tibet.
Though this at first seems somewhat reassuring, this article was written before Columbia’s Confucius Institute began its operations, and has no bearing on whether the Institute actually operates according to Liu’s promises. It does not tell us whether the Confucius Institute has, in its four years of existence, ever funded any research proposals that mention Tibet, and whether its faculty are free to design their syllabi as they choose. From the Institute’s public programming advertised online until this point, it does not seem that they have run any programming that is remotely controversial.
Upon Professor Liu’s suggestion, I reached out to the University Office of Public Affairs with my inquiry. Although for a while it seemed that someone would be willing to talk to me, I ultimately received the following email from Robert Hornsby, Associate Vice President for Media Relations:
"No one is available for an interview about this matter. Briefly for your background, the Confucius Institute provides funding to Columbia in support of Chinese language programs, the study of Chinese culture and research. Faculty members supported under the grant remain subject to the University’s routine policies, practices, and rules regarding faculty members generally at the University. In addition, under Columbia’s agreement with the Institute, Columbia retains sole academic decision-making authority for all activities at the Columbia campus, including activities funded under the agreement. We have been pleased with the program’s success to date."
According to the Constitution and Bylaws of the Confucius Institutes (located on the Hanban website), foreign parties that apply to establish a Confucius Institute should be willing to “accept Confucius Institutes’ operation model and teaching model and be able to accept the oversight, evaluation and certification by the Head Office once the Institute is established.” Additionally, “All institutes must use the unified set of teaching materials supplied by the Head Office.” It also states that they “shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China” and “shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of the Confucius Institute” (Section 1, articles 6 and 7). Finally, all Confucius Institutes are required to observe the obligation “to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the Headquarters.”
This document explicitly states that in order to receive funding, all Confucius Institutes must comply with the rules of the Headquarters in Beijing. Did Columbia strike a special deal with Hanban, allowing its Confucius Institute to exercise complete academic freedom? What, exactly, are the terms of this agreement? No one from the Confucius Institute at Columbia nor the Office of Public Affairs would answer this question.
Many members of the academic community have expressed concern over the spread of Confucius Institutes on American college campuses. In April 2014, more than 100 professors at University of Chicago signed a petition calling for the school to shut down its on-campus Confucius Institute. The petition stated that the University lacked sufficient control over the hiring and training of teachers involved and argued that terminating the relationship would be “consistent with the intellectual principles and values of the university.” This petition was successful, and Chicago’s Confucius Institute was closed soon after. Several other universities, including the seven other members of the Ivy League besides for Columbia, have refused to affiliate with the Confucius Institute in the first place.
And yet, despite the public controversy over the Confucius Institute on other campuses, there has been virtually no conversation about it at Columbia. Aside from one Spectator article when the Institute was established in 2011, it has not been mentioned in any student or University produced publication ever since. This could be because Columbia’s Confucius Institute has a little more autonomy than Confucius Institutes on other campuses. Professor Liu frames the program as a vehicle for academic exchange and mutual understanding, not as a forum for Chinese influence at Columbia. However, there is no evidence that this is actually the case.
Columbia’s Confucius Institute does not have a website that details its operations and lists its affiliated faculty. In fact, the only information about it on the internet is limited to an old webpage on the Hanban website, that states its location, its partnership with Renmin University, and the date it opened. There is no mention of the Institute on the website of the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, save for in Professor Liu’s official title as Director. Additionally, the list of faculty affiliated with the Institute are nowhere to be found nor are the researchers and instructors who receive funding.
If Columbia wants us to believe that its branch of the Confucius Institute does not violate the principles of academic freedom, then the University must be more transparent about the Institute’s programming. At the very least, the Office of Public Affairs should be open about what the Hanban’s money actually funds. The Confucius Institute’s mission, faculty, and research topics should be on the EALAC website, or it should have a website of its own. Additionally, the exact terms of Columbia’s agreement with Hanban should be made open to the public. If they cannot do these simple tasks, the University will strengthen the suspicion that they actually have something to hide.
//LEEZA HIRT is a junior in Columbia College and Editor in Chief of The Current. She can be reached at [email protected].