// literary & arts //
Fall 2005
Neo-Conned?
|
The Right War?
|
Unless you have been sequestered in heartland America, you have probably seen one of these slogans: "Bush Lied, Soldiers Died," "Drop Bush, Not Bombs," "Support Our Troops, Impeach Bush." These liberal slogans have forged their way to the forefront of the public debate on Iraq. An oversimplified opposition has come to dominate the terms of the debate, labeled either "Democrat vs. Republican" or "liberal vs. conservative;" this debate has focused on whether or not the Saddam regime was developing and building weapons of mass destruction, and on the Bush administration's attempt to link the Iraqi dictator with al-Qaeda terrorism. But, more quietly, without the crass public-relations and flashy bumper stickers, conservatives have been engaged in internal debate over the merit of the current Iraq war. Within this second debate a diverse range of conservative opinions emerges, and it becomes clear that most self-labeled conservatives, or even Republicans, are far from Bush–cronies, or even passive supporters of this administration's foreign policy.
Generally, American leftists like to claim that the question of the war's legitimacy is no longer at stake. When Congress voted to authorize the use of force, the argument begins, it did so based on information that Sadaam had weapons of wass destruction, information that has since been entirely discredited. Now, the only pressing issue that remains is devising the best exit strategy—how and when the army should pull out.
The conservative side, on the other hand, has not yet accepted the premise that the war was wrongheaded and illegitimate. For them, the war was never about WMDs, it was about the extent to which the US should deter budding totalitarianism. Thus, their debate about the war's legitimacy and merit continues in full force. In The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq, Gary Rosen has compiled essays from conservative writers which reflect the diversity of opinions that continue to surround all aspects of the war. Most of the essays were written after initial combat ended in 2003. Yet for their authors the benefit of hindsight has not erased the basic questions—which liberals, by and large, have stopped discussing.
Rosen sets up The Right War as a debate between neo-cons and realists. To do so, he solicited contributions from diplomats, journalists, rogue politicians such as Henry Kissinger, Fareed Zakaria (Editor of Newsweek International), and Pat Buchanan, whom he describes as "no longer accepted in the conservative party." Quite an array of writers; not all even consider themselves conservative, yet they have found themselves in the middle of the conservative debate.
Despite the book's neat construction, it becomes clear that the conservative debate cannot be categorized into organized, pre-established categories. Take, for instance, the essay "Like It's 1999: How We Could Have Done it Right" by Fareed Zakaria, an admirer of Kissinger and a self-styled foreign policy realist, someone who realizes that war is sometimes inevitable. He states "Foreign policy is not theology. The only way to make sensible choices in this realm is to weigh costs and benefits." This statement acknowledges that a choice to go to war cannot be perceived as a predetermined fate, the way the Bush administration may have seen it. The stereotypical anti-Bush realist merely highlights the fact that the war has been disorganized, a series of chaotic and frustrating campaigns. Zakaria, however, expresses a more moderate, ambivalent position that while the war may not have been conducted correctly, some response to the intransigent regime was certainly necessary. Zakaria says that he did not necessarily support the war, but that containment of Saddam by means of sanctions, as implemented by the senior Bush and Clinton administrations, would no longer work. He writes, Saddam "had always found ways to manipulate the sanctions system by cheating and smuggling...Yet,the sanctions were pushing hundred of thousands of Iraqis into poverty every year..." Additionally, Zakaria reminds the reader that although superficially Iraq looks like a total disaster, the US military has developed an organized, coherent military command. Many of the other authors make similar claims, writing as if to reassure the reader, comfort the American public, or critics might say, to maintain solidarity with the Administration. Iraq needs time, they reiterate, and that regardless of the war's legitimacy, they all contend with the facts on the ground: the US military is embroiled in urban warfare on the streets of Mosul, Basra and even Baghdad, and the best thing is to let it accomplish the mission.
Interestingly, some of the strongest and most deeply rooted criticism emerges from the fundamental tenets of conservative ideology. Since the Bush administration first beat the war drums, neo-cons have attempted to squash other right-wing voices. Andrew Sullivan represents the traditional conservative voice, reflecting skeptically on a war which he now perceives as counter to American interests abroad. Sullivan writes that "the war to depose Saddam was always an unlikely one for conservatives. Traditional conservatives tend to view most attempts at radically altering society with a good degree of skepticism." His essay, "Quitters," suggests that perhaps invading Iraq may not have been in line with conservative values at all.
America has become all too familiar with the genre of war criticism called liberal muck. In response, Rosen has finally placed the most important conservative voices in one volume, showing us that conservatives are far from a homogenous group. For the reader, the most important aspect of this book is the variety of voices and diversity of opinion. Labels aside, Rosen's primary contribution has been create a forum for this intellectual debate. In fact, by presenting real political thinkers in their own voices, Rosen's compilation eludes attempts to pigeonhole it, serving to deconstruct existing political categories.
If this book fails to draw clear distinctions and establish conservative camps, it does present intelligent debate that challenges the vision and clarity of the war. Walking away from the book, I was pleased that conservatives need not be unified in their views on the war and that some even cautiously see encouraging signs in the Middle East. In his foreword, Rosen discusses historic developments in the quest for Middle East democracy: Lebanon has held free elections, as has the Palestinian Authority, and "even Egypt and Saudi Arabia have given hints to democratic ferment." If the American Right will take the hit for its mistakes in Iraq, it certainly deserves credit for past and future big-picture foreign policy successes.
Generally, American leftists like to claim that the question of the war's legitimacy is no longer at stake. When Congress voted to authorize the use of force, the argument begins, it did so based on information that Sadaam had weapons of wass destruction, information that has since been entirely discredited. Now, the only pressing issue that remains is devising the best exit strategy—how and when the army should pull out.
The conservative side, on the other hand, has not yet accepted the premise that the war was wrongheaded and illegitimate. For them, the war was never about WMDs, it was about the extent to which the US should deter budding totalitarianism. Thus, their debate about the war's legitimacy and merit continues in full force. In The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq, Gary Rosen has compiled essays from conservative writers which reflect the diversity of opinions that continue to surround all aspects of the war. Most of the essays were written after initial combat ended in 2003. Yet for their authors the benefit of hindsight has not erased the basic questions—which liberals, by and large, have stopped discussing.
Rosen sets up The Right War as a debate between neo-cons and realists. To do so, he solicited contributions from diplomats, journalists, rogue politicians such as Henry Kissinger, Fareed Zakaria (Editor of Newsweek International), and Pat Buchanan, whom he describes as "no longer accepted in the conservative party." Quite an array of writers; not all even consider themselves conservative, yet they have found themselves in the middle of the conservative debate.
Despite the book's neat construction, it becomes clear that the conservative debate cannot be categorized into organized, pre-established categories. Take, for instance, the essay "Like It's 1999: How We Could Have Done it Right" by Fareed Zakaria, an admirer of Kissinger and a self-styled foreign policy realist, someone who realizes that war is sometimes inevitable. He states "Foreign policy is not theology. The only way to make sensible choices in this realm is to weigh costs and benefits." This statement acknowledges that a choice to go to war cannot be perceived as a predetermined fate, the way the Bush administration may have seen it. The stereotypical anti-Bush realist merely highlights the fact that the war has been disorganized, a series of chaotic and frustrating campaigns. Zakaria, however, expresses a more moderate, ambivalent position that while the war may not have been conducted correctly, some response to the intransigent regime was certainly necessary. Zakaria says that he did not necessarily support the war, but that containment of Saddam by means of sanctions, as implemented by the senior Bush and Clinton administrations, would no longer work. He writes, Saddam "had always found ways to manipulate the sanctions system by cheating and smuggling...Yet,the sanctions were pushing hundred of thousands of Iraqis into poverty every year..." Additionally, Zakaria reminds the reader that although superficially Iraq looks like a total disaster, the US military has developed an organized, coherent military command. Many of the other authors make similar claims, writing as if to reassure the reader, comfort the American public, or critics might say, to maintain solidarity with the Administration. Iraq needs time, they reiterate, and that regardless of the war's legitimacy, they all contend with the facts on the ground: the US military is embroiled in urban warfare on the streets of Mosul, Basra and even Baghdad, and the best thing is to let it accomplish the mission.
Interestingly, some of the strongest and most deeply rooted criticism emerges from the fundamental tenets of conservative ideology. Since the Bush administration first beat the war drums, neo-cons have attempted to squash other right-wing voices. Andrew Sullivan represents the traditional conservative voice, reflecting skeptically on a war which he now perceives as counter to American interests abroad. Sullivan writes that "the war to depose Saddam was always an unlikely one for conservatives. Traditional conservatives tend to view most attempts at radically altering society with a good degree of skepticism." His essay, "Quitters," suggests that perhaps invading Iraq may not have been in line with conservative values at all.
America has become all too familiar with the genre of war criticism called liberal muck. In response, Rosen has finally placed the most important conservative voices in one volume, showing us that conservatives are far from a homogenous group. For the reader, the most important aspect of this book is the variety of voices and diversity of opinion. Labels aside, Rosen's primary contribution has been create a forum for this intellectual debate. In fact, by presenting real political thinkers in their own voices, Rosen's compilation eludes attempts to pigeonhole it, serving to deconstruct existing political categories.
If this book fails to draw clear distinctions and establish conservative camps, it does present intelligent debate that challenges the vision and clarity of the war. Walking away from the book, I was pleased that conservatives need not be unified in their views on the war and that some even cautiously see encouraging signs in the Middle East. In his foreword, Rosen discusses historic developments in the quest for Middle East democracy: Lebanon has held free elections, as has the Palestinian Authority, and "even Egypt and Saudi Arabia have given hints to democratic ferment." If the American Right will take the hit for its mistakes in Iraq, it certainly deserves credit for past and future big-picture foreign policy successes.
Having spent one year at Michigan State, Jeremy Pappas (GS/JTS ‘08), realized that he couldn't go to a school for their football team and decided to transfer to the Joint Program with Columbia and JTS. He is majoring in History and Political Science, loving the Steelers and still obsessed with Michigan State sports even though he's on the east coast.