// literary & arts //
Fall 2005
Please Ma'am, May I Have Some More?
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Knowing the Enemy:
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Four years after the attacks of September 11th, those with an interest in understanding the nature of jihadism have done their homework to understand what drives these religious zealots. Those who have not had their heads in the sand are generally familiar with basic jihadist ideology at this point: the obligation to engage in an armed struggle to turn all infidel societies toward Islam. Johns Hopkins military historian Mary Habeck's upcoming book Knowing the Enemy tries to give insight into the psyche of the fanatical jihadist. Habeck's book certainly presents the basics: a detailed analysis of jihadism, focusing on its history, its ideologically radical approach to the Quran, and its relations with non-jihadists. But one cannot escape the feeling that the information presented here isn't particularly new. In fact, it sounds eerily familiar to all of the encyclopedia, magazine, and newspaper articles written on the topic in the past four years.
Readers that will pick up Knowing the Enemy are not going to expect a crash course in what these extremist religious terrorists believe. Rather, they will seek real suggestions about how our society can move forward to successfully confront these radicals and the threats they pose to democracy, security, and the openness of our society. Disappointingly, this book falls well short of these expectations. The emphasis of this book is on the history and ideology of the movement and on the extremist interpretation of the Quran that these radicals use to justify their widespread militaristic actions, not on political solutions or policy suggestions.
Habeck begins her exploration of jihadism with the roots of the movement. She discusses the major figures, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas contributed to the rise of this radical ideology. According to Habeck, Al-Banna, an Egyptian social and political reformer, contributed to radical Islam by characterizing the threat of the West not only as an imperial physical threat, but also as an intellectual one. This ideology prompted Al-Banna to found the Muslim Brotherhood, an ideological party that nurtured radicals and terrorists, despite the Brotherhood's stance against violence from the 1960s onward. Mawdudi, a Pakistani theologian, posited that since God is absolutely sovereign, nothing falls outside His law. While Mawdudi primarily influenced jihadist thought through his published writings, he also founded the Islamic Party in Pakistan. In doing so, Mawdudi built upon Al-Banna by applying his theological contribution to politics in a way that Al-Banna could not. Qutb, a theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood, carried Mawdudi's ideas back to Al-Banna's system. Qutb supported Mawdudi's argument and added to it the revolutionary idea that Muslims who do not follow Islamic law were ‘unbelievers.' Thus, he extended the range of jihad to non-believing Muslims. Ironically, Habeck also contends that jihadist scholars frequently strip Western ideas of their meaning and redefine them to apply to Islam. She writes that, "Mawdudi, Qutb, and later jihadist ideologues would routinely empty European ideas like capitalism, socialism, and women's liberation of their original meanings and redefine them to make them compatible with their vision of Islam."
After explaining the historical background of jihadism, Habeck spends an inordinate amount of time demonstrating the jihadists' ideological approach to the Quran. She successfully conveys the jarring effect that their views have on outsiders. In example after example, the jihadists twist the text of their holy books to reach their extremist conclusions, or they selectively choose the text that best fits their aims. In her discussion of jihadists' understanding of the verses that address jihad, Habeck writes:
The emphasis is always on those parts of the books that define jihad as fighting and that paint the relationship between believer and unbeliever in the bleakest terms. Jihadists never mention the texts that talk about tolerance or peace and have declared invalid an important hadith that calls the internal struggle to follow God to "greater jihad" and fighting the "lesser jihad".
Habeck deftly presents the irony of this selective understanding by repeatedly reminding the reader that jihadism claims to take the Quran literally and discredits those who pick and choose from God's laws. For the reader, the result is a clear understanding of the rhetoric and actions of jihadist, and the major gap that exists between them and the un-mangled Quranic text.
Habeck also successfully illustrates the conspiracy theories that abound in jihadist beliefs. She writes:
The charge against Jews is made explicitly by Hamas. In its manifesto the group asserts that "with their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there."
In jihadists' revisionist understanding of history, the imperialism in the Middle East, the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, and the push for education reform, all result from the West's unrelenting quest to destroy Islamic values.
After reading this exhaustive history of jihadism, the reader is understandably distressed by the jihadist ideology and waits eagerly for Habeck's compelling strategies for tackling the problems jihadists present and for diffusing the threat of radical Islam. Such strategies are conveyed minimally if at all, at least in the pre-publication version of the book made available to reviewers. If anything, Habeck's proposed tactics seem a bit naïve in the face of the challenges she so effectively delineates.
The combination of such detailed analysis of jihadism with such simplistic and stale ideas for effecting change is disappointing. Habeck argues for a continued war on the ground to end jihadist control of places like Afghanistan. She argues that we must change the name of the war from "the war on terror" to "the war on jihadism" in order to make it clear that we are fighting a definite enemy with an ideology, and thus ensure that the war cannot be misrepresented as a war against Islam. I find it difficult to believe that merely renaming the war will alter its perception in the Middle East.
Habeck also contends that Muslims discredit American actions due to American support of corrupt regimes in many Middle Eastern countries. She asserts that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict increases tension and supplies ammunition for radicals to imbue hate in the mainstream Muslim population. In this assessment, Habeck simply rehashes the argument Tom Friedman of The New York Times has trumpeted for the last four years. Finally, she argues that democracy can effect change in showing that it can coexist with traditional Islamic beliefs.
Economist Arnold Kling recently wrote a sobering essay about the threat that technological advances pose to the war on terror. He argues that reforming a country can take decades, much longer than it is likely to take for the terrorists and extremists to obtain or, worse, use biological or nuclear weapons. For that reason, Kling argues, surveillance and other technologies will determine the effectiveness of the war on radical Islam.
Reading this essay merely accentuated what is lacking in Habeck's book. This country has begun to recognize that traditional methods are not going to suffice in this war on terror and extremist ideology. A standard ‘hot war' coupled with exportation of ideas will not be enough. Kling proposes a beefing up of surveillance technology to help frustrate the terrorists' ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction. His proposition provides a contrast of fresh, non-traditional goals that have the potential to make inroads in the war on terror to the unoriginal ones Habeck proposes.
Habeck's Knowing the Enemy perhaps comes to us a few years too late. Her careful exploration of jihadist ideology is largely familiar, and her solutions to the greater threat of extremism can hardly be taken seriously. When we should be looking for creative solutions that combine cultural warfare with the ‘hot war' on the ground and with monitoring technological advances, Habeck only musters the cliché solutions of promoting peace and beating them with democracy. We are left hanging with the question that we wish the book was about: knowing what to do with the enemy.
Readers that will pick up Knowing the Enemy are not going to expect a crash course in what these extremist religious terrorists believe. Rather, they will seek real suggestions about how our society can move forward to successfully confront these radicals and the threats they pose to democracy, security, and the openness of our society. Disappointingly, this book falls well short of these expectations. The emphasis of this book is on the history and ideology of the movement and on the extremist interpretation of the Quran that these radicals use to justify their widespread militaristic actions, not on political solutions or policy suggestions.
Habeck begins her exploration of jihadism with the roots of the movement. She discusses the major figures, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas contributed to the rise of this radical ideology. According to Habeck, Al-Banna, an Egyptian social and political reformer, contributed to radical Islam by characterizing the threat of the West not only as an imperial physical threat, but also as an intellectual one. This ideology prompted Al-Banna to found the Muslim Brotherhood, an ideological party that nurtured radicals and terrorists, despite the Brotherhood's stance against violence from the 1960s onward. Mawdudi, a Pakistani theologian, posited that since God is absolutely sovereign, nothing falls outside His law. While Mawdudi primarily influenced jihadist thought through his published writings, he also founded the Islamic Party in Pakistan. In doing so, Mawdudi built upon Al-Banna by applying his theological contribution to politics in a way that Al-Banna could not. Qutb, a theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood, carried Mawdudi's ideas back to Al-Banna's system. Qutb supported Mawdudi's argument and added to it the revolutionary idea that Muslims who do not follow Islamic law were ‘unbelievers.' Thus, he extended the range of jihad to non-believing Muslims. Ironically, Habeck also contends that jihadist scholars frequently strip Western ideas of their meaning and redefine them to apply to Islam. She writes that, "Mawdudi, Qutb, and later jihadist ideologues would routinely empty European ideas like capitalism, socialism, and women's liberation of their original meanings and redefine them to make them compatible with their vision of Islam."
After explaining the historical background of jihadism, Habeck spends an inordinate amount of time demonstrating the jihadists' ideological approach to the Quran. She successfully conveys the jarring effect that their views have on outsiders. In example after example, the jihadists twist the text of their holy books to reach their extremist conclusions, or they selectively choose the text that best fits their aims. In her discussion of jihadists' understanding of the verses that address jihad, Habeck writes:
The emphasis is always on those parts of the books that define jihad as fighting and that paint the relationship between believer and unbeliever in the bleakest terms. Jihadists never mention the texts that talk about tolerance or peace and have declared invalid an important hadith that calls the internal struggle to follow God to "greater jihad" and fighting the "lesser jihad".
Habeck deftly presents the irony of this selective understanding by repeatedly reminding the reader that jihadism claims to take the Quran literally and discredits those who pick and choose from God's laws. For the reader, the result is a clear understanding of the rhetoric and actions of jihadist, and the major gap that exists between them and the un-mangled Quranic text.
Habeck also successfully illustrates the conspiracy theories that abound in jihadist beliefs. She writes:
The charge against Jews is made explicitly by Hamas. In its manifesto the group asserts that "with their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there."
In jihadists' revisionist understanding of history, the imperialism in the Middle East, the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, and the push for education reform, all result from the West's unrelenting quest to destroy Islamic values.
After reading this exhaustive history of jihadism, the reader is understandably distressed by the jihadist ideology and waits eagerly for Habeck's compelling strategies for tackling the problems jihadists present and for diffusing the threat of radical Islam. Such strategies are conveyed minimally if at all, at least in the pre-publication version of the book made available to reviewers. If anything, Habeck's proposed tactics seem a bit naïve in the face of the challenges she so effectively delineates.
The combination of such detailed analysis of jihadism with such simplistic and stale ideas for effecting change is disappointing. Habeck argues for a continued war on the ground to end jihadist control of places like Afghanistan. She argues that we must change the name of the war from "the war on terror" to "the war on jihadism" in order to make it clear that we are fighting a definite enemy with an ideology, and thus ensure that the war cannot be misrepresented as a war against Islam. I find it difficult to believe that merely renaming the war will alter its perception in the Middle East.
Habeck also contends that Muslims discredit American actions due to American support of corrupt regimes in many Middle Eastern countries. She asserts that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict increases tension and supplies ammunition for radicals to imbue hate in the mainstream Muslim population. In this assessment, Habeck simply rehashes the argument Tom Friedman of The New York Times has trumpeted for the last four years. Finally, she argues that democracy can effect change in showing that it can coexist with traditional Islamic beliefs.
Economist Arnold Kling recently wrote a sobering essay about the threat that technological advances pose to the war on terror. He argues that reforming a country can take decades, much longer than it is likely to take for the terrorists and extremists to obtain or, worse, use biological or nuclear weapons. For that reason, Kling argues, surveillance and other technologies will determine the effectiveness of the war on radical Islam.
Reading this essay merely accentuated what is lacking in Habeck's book. This country has begun to recognize that traditional methods are not going to suffice in this war on terror and extremist ideology. A standard ‘hot war' coupled with exportation of ideas will not be enough. Kling proposes a beefing up of surveillance technology to help frustrate the terrorists' ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction. His proposition provides a contrast of fresh, non-traditional goals that have the potential to make inroads in the war on terror to the unoriginal ones Habeck proposes.
Habeck's Knowing the Enemy perhaps comes to us a few years too late. Her careful exploration of jihadist ideology is largely familiar, and her solutions to the greater threat of extremism can hardly be taken seriously. When we should be looking for creative solutions that combine cultural warfare with the ‘hot war' on the ground and with monitoring technological advances, Habeck only musters the cliché solutions of promoting peace and beating them with democracy. We are left hanging with the question that we wish the book was about: knowing what to do with the enemy.
//Dov Friedman, CC ‘09, is interested in majoring in History and MEALAC.